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Collective Bargaining in the 
in the Public Sector: A Re-Examination 
C. Brian Williams 
This paper calls for a new direction in the study of public 
sector collective bargaining away from the « issue » and « pro-
blem » approach in favor of a re-examination, in the light of 
our expérience over the past décade, of the physiology of the 
technique itself with particular référence to the appropriateness 
of current public sector collective bargaining strctures. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past décade one of the major topics before Industrial Re-
lations scholars in Canada has been the extension and development of 
the collective bargaining technique as the instrument for determining 
wages, hours, and working conditions in the public sector fields of em-
ployment. In turn, the bulk of our efforts hâve focused on a number of 
« issues •» and « problems » which hâve emerged as a resuit of the trans-
plantation of a private sector conceived instrument into the anatomy of 
our public sector. Some of the more prominent « issues » and « problems » 
include the : (i) détermination of the appropriate bargaining unit, (ii) 
techniques for impasse resolution and the associated issues of (a) the rôle 
and function of a public sector work stoppage, (b) the sovereignty of Par-
liament, and (c) the détermination of an « essential industry, » (iii) inex-
périence and immaturity in the relationship, (iv) instability in public 
service cost structures, and (v) ambiguity between the prerequisites of the 
collective bargaining technique and perceived norms of professional con-
duct. 
There are those who allège with 
considérable vigor and with some 
évidence that the introduction of 
this « foreign technique » has not 
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led to the labor relations solution expected of it. Regardless of the merits of 
such a charge, it is fair to say that we hâve yet to corne up with the ap-
propriate public sector labor relations solution and one must wonder if 
continued préoccupation with « issues » and « problems » represents 
the most appropriate direction in our subséquent study and research 
efforts in this challenging field. 
This paper calls for a new direction in the study of public sector 
collective bargaining away from the « issue » and « problem » approach 
in favor of a re-examination, in the light of our expérience over the past 
décade, of the physiology of the technique itself with particular référence 
to the appropriateness of current public sector collective bargaining 
structures. We seek the identification and articulation of the theoretical 
foundations of public sector collective bargaining structures and their 
functioning. We ask not : how can the impasse be resolved ?, but, why 
the impasse ? We leave the question ; what are the alternatives to the 
work stoppage ?, in favor of, why the work stoppage ? We are more 
interested in the question ; does collective bargaining contribute to the 
sharp rise in public service costs ?, rather than, how can one control this 
sharp rise in public service costs ? 
Although there are exceptions, the structural underpinnings of public 
sector collective bargaining in law and in practice are basically the same 
as those employed in the private sector. In addition, while our knowledge 
of the theoretical foundations of private sector collective bargaining struc-
tures and their functioning is considérable, the theoretical foundations 
and functioning of public sector structures hâve been largely ignored 1. 
As noted by Stieber, this has led : 
Some students of industrial relations (to question) the desirability of 
transferring, with little or no modification, the légal framework, con-
cepts and institutions, which hâve become well established in private 
industry to the public sector. They prefer an approach which would 
take account of the important différences between public and private 
employment, both with regard to the unique characteristics of the 
(government) as employer and the indigenous development of orga-
nizations representing public employées. 2 
This observation is certainly not new as it was first expressed al-
most at the same time as the move to collective bargaining in the public 
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sector was first introduced. However, at that time and to today, its im-
plications hâve been largely ignored ; in part because of the momentum 
which quickly developed in favor of public sector collective bargaining, 
in part because of the lack of évidence at that time to support the hypo-
thesis that a private sector technique could not function effectively in 
the public sector, and in part because of the full professorships and Con-
sulting fee opportunities which would follow as a resuit of a firm and 
deliberate introduction of the technique and a subséquent « issue » and 
« problem » research focus in an attempt to evaluate its workings and 
effectiveness. It is hère argued that this heretofore meaningful « issue » 
and « problems » approach has reached the point of rapidly diminishing 
returns and it is now appropriate and indeed urgent that we go back and 
examine more closely the still unattended observations which for so long 
hâve resided so mutely in the rudely introduced wound we made in public 
sector anatomy in order to accommodate our beloved collective bargaining 
technique. 
1
 As presented by Bevars MABRY the literature can be classified as follows : 
( 1 ) Bargaining power : Neil W. CHAMBERLAIN, Collective Bargaining, New York, 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951, 534 pp., Chapter 10; also see his A General Theory 
of Economie Process, New York, Harper & Row, 1955, 370 pp. ; John T. DUNLOP, 
Wage Détermination Under Trade Unions, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1928, 
230 pp., John R. HICKS, The Theory of Wages, New York, The Macmillan Co., 
1932, 247 pp., Chapter 7 ; Alfred KUHN, The Study of Society : A Unified Approach, 
Homewood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963, 810 pp., Chapters 17-19 ; Charles 
E. LINDBLOM, « Bargaining Power in Price and Wage Détermination, » Quarterly 
Journal of Economies, Cambridge, Vol. 62, May, 1948, pp. 396-417. (II) Bargaining 
power under uncertainty : G.L.S. SHACKLE, Expectations in Economies, London, 
Cambridge University Press, 1949, 146 pp. ; F. ZEUTHEN, Problems of Monopoly 
and Economie Warfare, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1930, 152 pp. 
(III) Game theory : R. Duncan LUCE and Howard RAIFFA, Games and Décisions, 
New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957, 509 pp. ; John NASH, « Two-Person 
Coopérative Games, » Econometrica, Chicago, Vol. 21, No. 1, January, 1953, pp. 
128-40 ; T.C. SCHELLING, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1960, 309 pp. (IV) A gênerai theory of bargaining : J. PEN, The 
Wage Rate Under Collective Bargaining, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1959, 216 pp. ; Cari STEVENS, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotia-
tions, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963, 192 pp. This list is by no means 
exhaustive. 
2
 Jack STIEBER, « Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, » in Challenges 
to Collective Bargaining, (Lloyd Ulman, Editor), Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 
1967, 180 pp., p. 77, and J. D. Mura, Collective Bargaining by Public School 
Teachers (Task Force on Labor Relations, No. 21), Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1968, 
382 pp., p. 315. 
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THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TECHNIQUE 
ITS DESIGN AND FUNCTIONING 
From the words of the Webb's we hâve the term. From the trade 
unionists and their outriding intellectuals we hâve its design and function-
ing. From the writings of scholars over the subséquent 82 years of its 
life we hâve amassed a body of knowledge which at least in terms of 
weight and careers easily outstrips the record of any other concept in 
the industrial relations field. We hâve théories of collective bargaining, 
models of collective bargaining, agonizing excursions into the définition 
of collective bargaining, and simulations of collective bargaining. It has 
been poked and prodded by the institutional economists, bandied about 
by the behavioralists, and reduced to an absurd oversimplification by the 
mathematical game theorists and simulators. In the light of ail this, what 
can we say about the structural underpinnings of collective bargaining and 
the implications of each to the success of the technique in the public 
employment sector ? 
First some gênerai observations. The purpose of the collective 
bargaining technique is to bring forth an agreement on the terms and 
conditions which will apply to the persons covered by it. If no agreement 
is produced short of an actual work stoppage then collective bargaining 
has failed. Collective bargaining is a classic case of decision-making in 
the face of uncertainty. Neither party can say for sure what the final 
settlement position is, but each attempts to reach it at the lowest possible 
cost and each adopts a bargaining strategy for the purpose of doing just 
that. It is a process that is designed in a way that will take two parties 
with widely differing initial positions at one point in time and bring them 
to an agreement on a commun position at some subséquent time. 
This remarkable ability to reduce and eliminate différences through 
time is the essence, virtue, and justification for the collective bargaining 
technique and any application of the technique must ensure the préserva-
tion and integrity of this différence resolving quality. This quality has been 
the center of a great deal of study by private sector oriented collective 
bargaining scholars, particularly those primarily concerned with collective 
bargaining theory. The two more common issues hâve been (i) what 
détermines the degree to which this quality is présent in a collective rela-
tionship ? and (ii) in what way does it influence the timing and terms of 
settlement ? The question is : are thèse qualities sufficiently preserved and 
présent when the technique is applied in the public sector fields of em-
ployment ? We think not. It is our conviction, based upon the argument 
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put forth in private sector collective bargaining theory, that the strength 
of this différence resolving ability dépends upon the présence of certain 
qualities in the collective bargaining structure and in the impact of each 
on the relationship between the parties. We argue that currently employed 
public sector collective bargaining structures do not sufficiently positively 
stimulate the variables which détermine this quality. 
Although the proof of our position must wait upon the completion 
of work which is now well underway, it is possible to outline the approach 
and framework within which we are working. 
From the vast literature on collective bargaining in gênerai and its 
theoretical foundations in particular, we hâve identified the variables 
which, it is alleged, détermine the strength of the différence resolving 
quality of collective bargaining. 
We examined each variable in the public and private sector contexts 
in an attempt to identify any variation in the présence or quality of each 
in either sector. 
As a resuit of this comparative analysis, we hâve identified some six 
variables, ail of which are structural in character, each of which has a 
notable différence in présence or quality between the private and public 
sectors and which to us represent a structural incongruency. 
For each of the six structural incongruencies we are presently 
attempting to establish a causal relationship with three observed qualities 
in current public sector collective bargaining structures each of which 
impairs the différence resolving quality of collective bargaining. 
We anticipate that the pursuit of this approach will lead not only 
to the articulation of a cause and effect relationship between the six 
structural incongruencies and the three observed qualities, but also will 
set forth some foundations upon which we may build a much needed 
body of knowledge in public sector collective bargaining theory and the 
steps we should take to improve public sector bargaining structures and 
their functioning. 
Structural Incongruencies. When the collective bargaining technique, 
as designed for application in the private sector is applied to the public 
sector we are particularly concerned about the possible réduction in the 
magnitude of its différence resolving quality as a resuit of différences 
in : (1) the scope of bargaining issues, (2) the nature and locus of 
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decision-making authority, (3) the économie and social nature and 
functioning of the public and private sectors of employment, (4) the 
nature of collective bargaining beneficiaries, (5) commitment to the 
adversary relationship, and (6) rôle and function of économie sanctions. 
Let's examine each of thèse observed incongruencies a little more closely. 
Scope of Bargainable Issues 
As conceived, and except for modem day limitations set forth in 
législation, the scope of issues to be embraced by collective bargaining 
was limited only by the power of one party to impose a defined scope 
on the other party. However, in the public sector many terms and con-
ditions of employment are set forth by alternative techniques such as (i) 
civil service régulations, (ii) législation, (iii) professional associations and 
(iv) codes of practice and ethics. 
Nature and Locus of Decision-Making Authority 
Collective bargaining, as is implicit in the term « parties » or 
« labor » or « management » contemplâtes a tendency for the centraliza-
tion of decision-making in the hands of those individuals participating 
in the collective bargaining technique or at least those who are responsible 
for the success of failure of the enterprise. However, the évidence seems 
to suggest that collective bargaining decision-making in the public sector 
is much more diffuse than was ever contemplated. In addition, it appears 
that this decision-making is shared between those who hâve managerial 
responsibility for a given public service activity and those who hâve 
political responsibility for the activity. As was pointed out a number of 
years ago : 
Private employer représentatives hâve broad discrétion to negotiate 
and commit the organization on almost ail matters. The negotiators 
and top management constitute a closely knit « team. » This is not 
true in the public sector. An agency head may hâve authority to 
negotiate on some issues but not on others . . . Even the chief executive 
does not hâve the final say on the distribution of funds and can only 
submit recommendations to the législative body, which has responsi-
bility for the overall budget and levying of taxes to balance income 
and expenditures. And, if the negotiated items include matters man-
dated by . . . law or civil service provisions, there is still an additional 
layer of décision makers to go through. This has important implications 
for determining the appropriate bargaining unit and the appropriais 
scope of negotiations within the given unit. 3 
3 STIEBER, ibid., p. 77. 
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Economie and Social Nature and Functioning of Priva te and Public Sectors 
There is considérable évidence in the history of the development 
of the collective bargaining technique in the private sector to conclude 
that the légal framework, procédures, ritual, techniques and conséquences 
were developed as a response to and in récognition of certain économie 
and social facts of private sector industrial life. Thèse facts of life 
include : 4 (i) application of the technique in what was and is basically 
still a compétitive market System, (ii) gênerai commitment by ail to the 
pursuit of économie self interest, (iii) little comment in législation on the 
bargaining process itself up to the point of the impasse, (iv) fierce 
résistance by employers to trade unionism and the collective bargaining 
technique, (v) the helplessness of the individual employée in the face of 
compétitive market forces and the complète unilatéral authority of 
employers to hire and fire, set wages, hours, and other conditions of 
employment, and (vi) the total and complète commitment of the Canadian 
trade union movement to the collective bargaining technique. 5 In some 
cases, thèse facts of life simply do not apply nor exist in the monopoly 
flavored public employment field. In others, their présence is notably 
less than what one observes in a private sector. Some évidence of thèse 
very basic différences réside within the development of the labels of 
« private » as opposed to « public » itself, and the fact that some acti-
vities hâve been designated « public » as opposed to « private. » 
Bénéficiaires of Collective Bargaining 
In gênerai, collective bargaining in the private sector contemplâtes 
a major beneficiary cadre composed almost exclusively of craft and 
industrial occupational classifications. It was conceived and designed by 
the « working class » and its friends as an instrument to be used for the 
benefit of the « working class. » However, the concept of « working 
class » has proven to be a hangup in public sector bargaining, encom-
passing as it does large groups of individuals which occupy technical, 
semi-professional, or professional occupational désignations and who find 
their perceived class définition and income levels somewhat in conflict 
with the beneficiary class connotation implicit in the technique of collec-
tive bargaining. 
4 Based on Stieber, ibid., p. 77-78. 
5
 For an excellent review of the principles underlining our collective bar-
gaining system and its évolution and opération see Canadian Industrial Relations 
(the Report of the Task Force on Labor Relations), Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 
1968, 250 pp. pp. 9-36 (hereafter referred to as Task Force Report). 
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Commitment to the Adversary Reiationship 
The implications of the adversary characteristic of the collective 
bargaining reiationship is often overlooked in the discussion of public 
sector collective bargaining structures. While the functioning of the 
characteristic is quite compatible with the doctrine of the pursuit of 
économie self interest, one must question the relevance of the unrestrain-
ed deployment of this characteristic and its associated doctrine in the 
public employment field. The adversary characteristic contemplâtes the 
turning of one party against another with the view to opposing or resisting 
each other in favor of one's position or objective. It breeds the conflict 
context which is so much a part of the collective bargaining activity. As 
the Task Force so aptly stated : « Paradoxical as it may appear, collec-
tive bargaining is designed to résolve conflict through conflict, or at least 
through the threat of conflict. It is an adversary System in which two 
basic issues must be resolved : how available revenue is to be divided, 
and how the clash between managements drive for productive eflïciency 
and the worker's quest for job, income, and psychic security are to be 
reconciled. » 6 
This conflict or résistance power of one party over another is mani-
fested in the collective bargaining process itself through the tactics and 
strategy adopted by the parties but its greatest manifestation cornes in 
the form of the impasse and the threatened work stoppage which normally 
émerges from it. Either the collective bargaining structure provides 
impasse resolution measures or it is inévitable that the parties will seek 
to résolve impasse through the work stoppage. In Canada, our long 
standing commitment to compulsory conciliation and ad hoc médiation 
are the techniques we use to attempt to résolve the impasse condition 
short of the actual work stoppage. It is our opinion that current public 
sector bargaining structures and the adversary quality of it too easily 
bring the parties to an impasse condition and that we offer too little in 
a way of alternative impasse resolution measures. In effect we, unin-
tentionally maybe, are relying too heavily on the work stoppage threat 
as an instrument of impasse resolution. In the public sector structures it 
is imperative that we dampen the adversary quality of the reiationship 
and the impasse condition that it spawns. We should be concemed not 
so much with the work stoppage and alternatives to it, but with the 
reasons for the impasse and its resolution without the resort to a work 
stoppage. 
6 Task Force Report, ibid., p. 119. 
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Rôle and Functlon of Economie Sanctions 
The rôle and functions of économie sanctions, normally in the form 
of a work stoppage, has received the attention of numerous collective 
bargaining scholars. 7 Suffice it to say hère that the work stoppage possi-
bility profoundly influences the relative bargaining power of the parties 
and as such plays a paramount rôle in the ability of collective bargaining 
to lead to the satisfactory resolution of différences between the parties. 
It is our opinion that the appropriate test for the introduction or rétention 
of the work stoppage possibility must réside in the degree to which the 
work stoppage possibility either avoids the émergence of an impasse 
condition or résolves an impasse condition. As Mabry has so cogently 
expressed it : 
Coercion, defined hère as the ability to impose sanctions in order 
to secure agreement on one's own ternis, becomes the significant ins-
trument. It is the instrument that compels one party to retreat from 
an established position, to consider alternative proposais for seule-
ment, to re-evaluate and to scrutinize more closely the issues pertaining 
to the negotiations, to explore seriously the conséquences of non-
settlement. This is true whether the tools of coercion are being envoked 
or whether their potential existence is simply being revealed. 
In union management relations, the principle direct method to im-
pose a loss is through the use of the strike or the lockout, and many 
of the other éléments of the bargaining power more or less indirectly 
operate to influence the effectiveness of the strike or lockout8. 
It is our position that the anticipated économie coercive nature of 
the work stoppage threat in the public employment field does not 
materialize in the public sector structure in part due to the lack of 
accountability on the part of the structure and in part due to the absence 
of the private sector économie functioning characteristics of nearly ail 
public sector activities. As a resuit, what coercive power does flow from 
the threatened work stoppage is not économie in nature, Le., the économie 
conséquences of a work stoppage to the activity, but political in nature, 
Le., the political conséquences flowing from the interruption of the parti-
cular public sector activity and the demand that it be restored. Again, 
according to Mabry : 
7
 For an excellent review see Bevars D. MABRY, Labor Relations and Col-
lective Bargaining, New York, Ronald Press, 1966, 475 pp., Chapters 8, 9 and 10, 
and Neil W. CHAMBERLAIN and James W. KUHN, Collective Bargaining, Toronto, 
McGraw-Hill (second édition), 1965, 451 pp., Chapter 7. 
8 Mabry, ibid., p. 202. 
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Since the exercise of coercive power has économie conséquences — 
that is, the ability to coerce applies the ability to reward or punish 
in monetary terms — some measure of one's own ability to coerce and 
the ability of his opponent to coerce becomes necessary if a rational 
économie décision is to be made regarding the terms of the contract 
to be negotiated. The measure of relative coercive power may be précise 
or imprécise, and the degree of précision dépends on the manner 
in which the components of power are identified and related, and 
the précision with which the components themselves are measured9. 
One may ask at this point : Why the préoccupation with the struc-
tural underpinnings of collective bargaining? The answer, while very 
easy to state is not so easy to demonstrate in a conclusive way. Simply 
stated, the structural underpinnings of collective bargaining and the 
context in which they were conceived, that is the économie and social 
nature of the private sector, hâve corne together to establish the relative 
bargaining power of the parties. It is the free exercise of this bargaining 
power which brings forth an acceptable collective agreement out of the 
exercise of the collective bargaining technique. That is, the différence 
resolving quality of collective bargaining is a function of the relative 
bargaining power of the parties. The thesis advanced hère is that the 
insertion of the collective bargaining technique, a technique conceived 
in the économie realities of the private sector and with supporting struc-
tural underpinnings complimentary to the realities of the private sector, 
into the public sector anatomy, has severely disturbed the relative bar-
gaining power positions of the parties and hence the degree to which 
collective bargaining is able to bring forth its différence resolving quality. 
This has occurred to such an extent that it is unlikely that collective 
bargaining is in a position to do the job we hâve asked of it in the public 
sector. Further, and assuming that scholars from Gommons to Chamber-
lain are correct, and we argue that they are, the direction to move in 
public sector collective bargaining is to the re-establishment of more 
meaningful bargaining relationships through changes in the législative 
structural underpinnings of public sector collective bargaining system. 
EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL INCONGRUENCIES ON PUBLIC 
SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
It is our contention that thèse structural incongruencies noted above 
hâve a profound impact on the ability of collective bargaining to bring 
forth acceptable agreements in the public sector. Although there are a 
9 Mabry, ibid., p. 202. 
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number of possible conséquences that one could cite, there are three 
that are currently receiving our attention. First, sharply contrasting 
approaches to and expectations in collective bargaining by the parties as 
a resuit of différences in the (i) nature of beneficiaries, (ii) commitment 
to the adversary relationship, and (iii) rôle and function of économie 
sanctions. Second, the absence of a sufficient degree of financial accoun-
tability and good faith on the part of the employer participant in the 
process due to différences in the (i) nature and locus of decision-making 
authority, and (ii) économie and social nature and functioning of the 
public and private sectors of employment. Third, ambiguities surrounding 
the rôle of the threatened work stoppage in bringing forth a successful 
conclusion of a collective agreement because of différences in the rôle 
and function of économie sanctions. 
Contrasting Approaches and Expectations of the Parties 
Most, if not ail, the unions operating within the public sector : 
. . . see little différence between employment in the private and public 
sectors. They focus upon the individual employée, his économie needs, 
his job and his fundamental needs as a citizen in a démocratie society. 
Since public employées do not differ from those in private industry 
in terms of their économie requirements and the désire to hâve a 
voice in determining their conditions of employment ; since almost 
every job in public employment has its counterpart in private industry ; 
and since management behaves the same way vis-à-vis employées, 
union leaders see no reason for différent laws, procédures and institu-
tions governing labor management relations in the public and private 
sectors of the economy 10. 
In short, the unions enter public service collective bargaining just 
as they would in the private sector. They assume that (i) the same 'rules' 
apply, (ii) the other side of the table perceives the process as they do, 
(iii) their counterparts are as serious and experienced as they are, (iv) 
the purpose of collective bargaining is to bring forth a collective agree-
ment, (v) they are fully prepared to exercise their right to strike (if they 
hâve the right to) and if such action is necessary, and (vi) the scope of 
issues is itself bargainable and determined by the parties. However, this 
may not be the case as the incongruencies noted earlier suggest and this 
is where the issues and problems in public sector collective bargaining 
start to émerge. 
10 Stieber, op. cit., p. 77. 
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Absence of Financial Accountability and Good Faith 
The employer is not the private employer and he does not, as the 
union's expectations call for, either approach the process or behave as a 
private employer. Nor in the face of the nature of his opérations can he 
do so even if he wanted to. In the usual case we are talking of a non-
profit opération. This has profound implications to collective bargaining. 
First, the bargaining is not over the distribution of future income flows 
and cost/price relationships and the ability of management to satisfy 
both (a responsibility they must assume) but simply the détermination of 
subséquent public service costs. n It seems reasonable to assume that 
the charge given the public sector negotiator is to keep thèse costs down, 
but it is not his responsibility to generate the required revenues and as 
such does not face the same conséquences of his actions as his private 
sector counterpart Indeed, the source of revenues may not even be 
generated from the activity in question (i.e., hospitals and teachers) but 
from the tax stream and the political/legislative structure that controls 
it. 12 Second, those who will be required to provide the revenues may not 
even be présent at the bargaining table and we hâve elsewhere been 
warned to guard against this. 13 It is in reality « broker bargaining. » In 
short, private sector bargaining calls for accountability by the parties 
and brings to the bargaining table the bargaining power relationship that 
cornes with it. The presently employed public sector bargaining structures 
do not call forth the required accountability on the part of the employer. 
We argue that the lack of accountability and the good faith associated 
with it in public sector structures does not favor successful collective 
bargaining.14 It leads to protracted negotiations, lack of good faith in 
bargaining, increases the likelihood of a failure to reach agreement short 
of an impasse, encourages, through lack of progress, the introduction and 
participation of the real revenue source decision-makers, and tends to 
generate a crisis atmosphère. In bargaining power terms it greatly reduces 
the power of the employer and equally increases the power of the union. 
11
 Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 119. 
12
 F. ISBESTER and Sandra CASTLE, « Labor Relations in Ontario Hospitals : A 
Question of Survival, » Industriàl Relations, Québec, Vol. 26, No. 2, April 1971, 
p. 356. 
!3 Task Force Report, op. cit., pp. 164-65. 
14
 Task Force Report, op cit., p. 163. We must lament the décision of The 
Task Force not to put the issue of good faith bargaining in Canada into the 
« . . . elaborate jurisprudential container...» used by our neighbor to the south. 
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Ambiguities in the Rôle of a Work Stoppage Threat 
The uncertainties surrounding the certainty of an actual work 
stoppage greatly affects the relative bargaining power of the parties. It 
is inconceivable to us to talk of a collective bargaining structure which 
does not hâve as part of it the uncertainties which flow from the possi-
bility of a work stoppage. This possibility remains the premier device of 
forcing the parties to résolve their différence. However, when applied in 
the public sector we are not ail that convinced that it in fact plays as 
important a différence resolving rôle as it does in the private sector. Or, 
put another way, that its contribution to différence resolution is signi-
ficantly less than the pain experienced by parties not part of the bar-
gaining process and who generally are the users of the particular service 
in question. In such a situation (if it does not contribute pressure to 
différence resolution) the possibility has been poorly placed and provides 
to our mind the soundest argument for removing it. As the distinguished 
members of the Task Force phrased it : « If the System of collective 
bargaining should be weighed and found wanting because of limitations 
inhérent in the System or because of defects that hâve too long gone 
uncorrected, society may reject the System as unsuitable for its pur-
pose. » 15 The fact of the matter is that the work stoppage threat leads 
to différence resolutions because of its translation by the parties into 
conséquences to the économie viability of the enterprise, that is, in sales, 
revenues, market losses, and détérioration of compétitive position. How-
ever, the bulk of the public sector is not encumbered by such mind 
boggling calculations and as such the influence of the threat is greatly 
reduced.16 In short, we fail to see how in traditional terms the work 
stoppage threat is able to perform its otherwise constructive différence 
resolving rôle in the public sector. On the other hand, the political con-
séquences and pressures flowing from the threat may be considérable (a 
reality that the private sector generally is under little obligation to 
recognize) and conceivably could lead to further différence resolving 
efforts at the bargaining table. However, to our mind this possibility is 
fraught with too great uncertainty to support its rétention as an élément 
in the structure, it normally surfaces only after an impasse has occurred, 
and it still does not get around our position that its contribution to 
15 Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 38. The interested reader may wish to review 
their section titled « Collective Bargaining in a Changing World, » pp. 37-40 as it is 
particularly relevant to the thèmes of this paper. 
16 Muir, op. cit., pp. 315-16 and Mabry, op. cit., pp. 189-202. 
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différence resolution is significantly less than the pain experienced by 
those who are the users of the particular service in question.17 
PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING STRUCTURES — 
SOME PROPOSALS 
It is our opinion that the conséquences noted above, ail of which 
follow from the structure incongruencies we noted earlier, seriously 
impair the ability of collective bargaining to do its job in the public 
sector. Further, we call upon ail of us who make our living off of the 
collective bargaining activity and the labor-management relationship in 
gênerai, to redirect our attention to thèse long standing observations and 
corne to the aid of our gratuitous but deeply troubled benefactor. With 
respect to the three conséquences brought forth in this paper we offer for 
your considération the foUowing two proposais, both of which would 
substantially reduce the conséquences that the structural incongruencies 
hâve for collective bargaining in the public sector. 
1. That steps be taken to reduce or eliminate the contrasting approaches 
and expectations of the parties in public sector collective bargaining. 
In part some relief follows from the accumulation of expérience with 
the technique and in part by a wide variety of educational activities 
which hâve accompanied the introduction of the collective bargaining 
system. 18 However, we propose that : 
(a) where applicable, public sector bargaining structures be removed 
from the « omnibus » private sector législation and be replaced 
by separate législation to cover the activity in question, and that 
(b) this législation, and existing public sector législation, set forth 
the principles, concepts, and time limits that are to govern the 
relationship, the purpose of the activity, the public sector res-
ponsibilities of the parties (or as Muir puts it « . . . the public 
nature of the employer's business, »)1 9 and the expectations 
concerning the outcome of the collective bargaining process, 20 
and, 
18
 Isbester and Castle, op. cit., pp. 360-61. 
17 Stieber, op. cit., pp. 82-84. 
19
 Muir, op. cit., p. 315. 
20
 In this proposai we find support in principle in Task Force Report observ-
ation : « We favor, then, the gênerai principle of freedom for the bargaining 
structure to find its own form, subject to the exercise of influence by the state 
where the public interest is high. > 
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(c) the parties in public sector collective bargaining give serious 
and deliberate considération to the introduction of continuous 
médiation : that is the attendance of a mutually acceptable inde-
pendent mediator at the commencement of collective bargaining 
with the view to facilitating a sound relationship and of staying 
with the parties through to the final resolution of ail différences. 21 
2. That we accept once and for ail that our public service expense and 
revenue decision-making System mitigates against the likelihood of 
designing into the system the degree of financial accountability and 
good faith on the part of the parties which is necessary to bring forth 
the différence resolving quality of the collective bargaining technique. 
We propose therefore that : 
(a) the wage and salary issue be taken out of the scope of public 
sector collective bargaining and thereby sharply reducing the 
degree of financial accountability required of the collective bar-
gaining process, and 
(b) subject to the satisfactory resolution of ail remaining issues 
within the scope of bargaining, that the wage and salary issue 
be referred to a tripartite forced choice arbitration board with its 
décision final and binding. 21 
Our acceptance of the forced choice technique is because of the 
excellent accountability quality it imposes upon the parties if they 
are to hâve any chance of their position being accepted by the 
board. Also, and we wish to stress, we do not offer it simply 
because it would avoid the public sector work stoppage (as a 
stoppage would still be possible) but because of our belief that 
the collective bargaining technique cannot adequately handle the 
wage and salary issue and it is unrealistic, indeed presumptious, 
to continue to ask it to do so. Our support for the removal of the 
wage and salary issue from the scope of bargaining in favor 
of the forced choice arbitration technique is offered not as an 
alternative to the work stoppage in the public sector but as an 
alternative to handling the issue through the collective bargaining 
technique. 
21 As suggested by Noël A. HALL, Vancouver Sun, Wednesday, May 17, 1972. 
22
 Cari STEVENS, « Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining, » 
Industrial Relations, Berkeley, Vol. 5, No. 2, February, 1966, pp. 38-52. 
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LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE DANS LE SECTEUR PUBLIC 
Cet article préconise une nouvelle orientation dans l'étude du phénomène de 
la négociation collective dans le secteur public, en délaissant les qualificatifs de 
« litige » et de « problème » pour leur substituer un réexamen, à la lumière de 
l'expérience acquise au cours de la dernière décennie, de la technique elle-même 
en référant principalement à la justesse des structures de négociation collective 
dans le secteur public tel qu'on le connaît actuellement. Nous allons nous efforcer 
d'en identifier et articuler les fondements théoriques dans le secteur public ainsi que 
leur fonctionnement. Il ne s'agit pas de nous demander : comment peut-on se tirer 
de l'impasse, mais pourquoi y a-t-il impasse ? Nous allons délaisser la question : 
par quoi remplacer la grève ? pour nous demander pourquoi y a-t-il grève ? 
Nous sommes plus intéressés à nous demander si la négociation collective con-
tribue à l'augmentation rapide des coûts dans les services publics qu'à nous deman-
der comment on peut avoir raison de cette augmentation. 
Tant en droit qu'en fait, l'infrastructure de la négociation collective dans le sec-
teur public est sensiblement la même que celle qu'on retrouve dans le domaine privé. 
De plus, alors que notre connaissance des assises théoriques des structures de la 
négociation collective dans le secteur privé ainsi que de leur fonctionnement est 
considérable, les assises théoriques et le fonctionnement des structures du secteur 
public sont à peu près inconnues. 
La négociation collective est un processus bâti de telle façon qu'il exige deux 
parties dont les positions divergent beaucoup à un moment donné et qui sont 
amenées à un moment ultérieur quelconque à s'accorder sur une position commune. 
Cette habileté remarquable à réduire et à éliminer leurs divergences grâce au 
temps qui passe est l'essence, le coeur et la justification de la technique de la négo-
ciation collective, et toute application d'une technique doit assurer la préservation 
et l'intégrité de cette qualité qui consiste à résorber des divergences. La question 
est la suivante : cette qualité est-elle assez préservée et présente lorsqu'on applique 
la technique dans le secteur public ? Nous ne le pensons pas. Nous sommes con-
vaincu, en nous fondant sur l'argument mis de l'avant dans la théorie de la négo-
ciation collective dans le secteur privé, que la valeur de l'habileté à résorber les 
divergences repose sur certaines qualités dans la structure de la négociation collec-
tive et dans l'impact que chaque partie exerce sur ses rapports avec l'autre. Nous 
estimons que les structures couramment utilisées pour la négociation collective 
dans le secteur public ne stimulent pas suffisamment ni d'une façon assez positive 
les variables qui donnent naissance à cette qualité. 
Lorsque la technique de négociation collective, telle qu'elle est conçue pour 
le secteur privé, est appliquée au secteur public, nous sommes surtout intéressés à 
réduire si possible la valeur de sa qualité de résorption des divergences qui résultent 
de (1) l'amplitude des questions négociables (2) de la nature et de la place du 
pouvoir de décision, (3) de la nature économique et sociale ainsi que du fonc-
tionnement des secteurs public et privé, (4) de la nature des bénéficiaires de la 
négociation collective, (5) de l'engagement dans des rapports conflictuels et (6) du 
rôle et de la fonction des sanctions économiques. Nous sommes d'avis que ces carac-
téristiques inadéquates ont un impact profond sur le pouvoir de la négociation à 
conduire à des ententes acceptables dans le secteur public. Même si l'on peut en 
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déduire bon nombre de conséquences possibles, il y en a trois qui attirent naturelle-
ment l'attention : d'abord, une attitude fort opposée des parties à la négociation 
collective et à ce qu'elles en attendent comme résultat des divergences qui se 
manifestent par (I) la nature des bénéficiaires, (II) par l'engagement dans des 
rapports de force conflictuels et (III) par le rôle et la fonction des sanctions écono-
miques : en deuxième lieu, l'absence d'un degré suffisant de maturité en matière 
de questions financières et de bonne foi du côté de la partie patronale dans le 
processus de négociation à cause de différences (I) quant à la nature et au niveau 
de l'autorité décisoire et (II) quant à la nature économique et sociale et au fonc-
tionnement des secteurs public et privé ; troisièmement, par les ambiguïtés qui 
entourent le rôle de la menace de grève pour favoriser la conclusion d'une conven-
tion collective par suite de divergences d'optique quant au rôle et à la fonction 
des sanctions économiques. 
En regard des trois observations que nous venons d'énoncer, nous préconisons 
les deux propositions suivantes qui, l'une et l'autre, atténueraient de beaucoup les 
conséquences des caractéristiques structurales inadéquates de la négociation collec-
tive dans le secteur public. 
En premier lieu, pour que des mesures valables soient prises afin d'atténuer 
ou d'éliminer l'optique sous lequel les parties conçoivent la négociation collective 
dans le secteur public et ce qu'elles en attendent, nous proposons que (a) partout où 
la chose est possible, les structures de négociation dans le secteur public soient 
exclues de la législation générale en matière de relations du travail et remplacées 
par des lois distinctes qui s'appliquent à ce secteur, (b) que cette législation et la 
législation existante dans le secteur public énonce les principes, les concepts et les 
délais qui serviront à régir les rapports, la raison d'être de l'activité, les responsa-
bilités et les aspirations des parties au sein du secteur public au sujet de l'aboutisse-
ment du processus de négociation et (c) que, enfin, les parties à la négociation 
collective du secteur public songent sérieusement au recours à la médiation 
continue, c'est-à-dire à la présence d'un médiateur indépendant qui leur soit 
mutuellement acceptable dès le commencement de la négociation collective et 
qui serait capable de faciliter l'établissement de rapports sains entre les parties et 
de demeurer avec elles jusqu'à la solution finale de tous leurs différends. Deuxiè-
mement, nous proposons qu'il soit reconnu une fois pour toutes que le système de 
prise de décision en matière de dépenses et de revenus dans le service public exige 
des parties la responsabilité et la bonne foi qui sont nécessaires pour faire naître 
cette qualité que possède la technique de négociation collective de résoudre les 
différends. Nous suggérons en conséquence que (a) la question salariale soit rayée 
du champ de la négociation collective dans le secteur public pour atténuer le degré 
de maturité financière exigé par le processus de négociation et (b) que, sous ré-
serve d'une solution satisfaisante de tous les autres points rattachés à la négociation, 
la question salariale soit référée à un arbitrage tripartite obligatoire dont la dé-
cision serait finale et exécutoire. 
